Dismissing the Sagan Standard

 We often face circumstances or phenomena we want to explain, and obtaining a likely explanation can take a lot of time --- something most of us find is demanded by many things wanting our attention. It would be nice to have a way of speedily eliminating unlikely explanations. Philosophers have recognized several rules of thumb for doing that, and they are known as philosophical razors. Such razors shave away unlikely explanations.

Some seem valid. For example, Occam’s razor: the simplest explanation is usually the correct one. The reason is that a simple explanation normally embraces less assumptions than a complex explanation, and the less assumptions there are, the lower the likelihood of error.

One philosophical razor that seems to me to be a fallacy is the Sagan standard: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Accepting the Sagan standard as valid implies accepting that simple claims do not require much evidence. To me, evidence is evidence, and if the evidence points to a conclusion that is common, or if it points to a conclusion that is remarkable, it is what it is. A proposition is either proven, or it is not.  Whether I assert that a cat’s name is Puff, or whether I assert that a man can bend a spoon purely by willing it to happen, both require proof. We accept the one claim more easily than the other because (1) the consequences of assuming the cat is Puff are not significant as assuming telekinesis, and (2) we know people can name their cats Puff, but we don’t know that anyone can bend spoons. Yet consequences are not proof, and I do not think that being unaware of a phenomenon heretofore is reason to dismiss its present instance. The acceptance of it should be determined by its present proof.